Investigating Distributional Robustness: Semantic Perturbations Using
  Generative Models by Dunn, Isaac et al.
Investigating Distributional Robustness:
Semantic Perturbations Using Generative Models
Isaac Dunn Laura Hanu Hadrien Pouget Daniel Kroening Tom Melham
Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford
isaac.dunn@cs.ox.ac.uk
Abstract
In many situations, the i.i.d. assumption cannot be relied upon; training datasets
are not representative of the full range of inputs that will be encountered during
deployment. Especially in safety-critical applications such as autonomous driving or
medical devices, it is essential that we can trust our models to remain performant. In
this paper, we introduce a new method for perturbing the semantic features of images
(e.g. shape, location, texture, and colour) for the purpose of evaluating classifiers’
robustness to these changes. We produce these perturbations by performing small
adjustments to the latent activation values of a trained generative neural network
(GAN), leveraging its ability to represent diverse semantic properties of an image.
We find that state-of-the-art classifiers are not robust to subtle shifts in the semantic
features of input data, and that adversarial training against pixel-space perturbations
is not just unhelpful: it is counterproductive.
1 Introduction
Deep learning models have proven to be powerful tools for tasks including image classification [1, 2],
with the ability to automatically identify useful features of their training images and combine these to
provide accurate label predictions [3]. Under the assumption that data are independently and identically
distributed (i.i.d.), they have shown a remarkable ability to generalise to unseen inputs [4]. However,
it is increasingly clear that the performance of these models drops drastically without this assumption;
optimising for i.i.d. accuracy alone results in models that are not robust to even modest distributional
shifts [5–8]. This is concerning because the non-static nature of the real world may well cause the distri-
bution of inputs to shift during deployment, and because it is difficult for any finite training set to capture
(a) Unperturbed generated image. (b) Semantic perturbation. (c) Semantically perturbed image.
Figure 1: A semantic perturbation changing the computed classification from ‘volcano’ to target label
‘goldfish’ by darkening the sky, causing an eruption of lava, slightly flattening the curve of the volcano,
and adding a rocky outcrop in the foreground.
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the full range of inputs that may be encountered. A model’s lack of robustness likely occurs due in part
to over-reliance on non-robust features that correlate well under the i.i.d. assumption but stop providing
useful information after a shift [9]. Before deploying models, especially in safety-critical contexts, we
must evaluate their robustness to possible unknown shifts in the distribution of encountered inputs.
In this work, we introduce a new method that evaluates the robustness of neural networks to semantic
perturbations: changes to a broad class of meaningful features, including the shape, location, size,
pose, colour, and texture of the objects in an image. Rather than hand-coding these features, we exploit
a generative neural network’s ability to learn and encode the full range of meaningful features of
an image distribution [10]. By introducing perturbations to the latent activation values of layers in a
trained generator network, we can cause semantic perturbations to the features of the generated images
(Figure 1). Since different layers of the generator encode features at different levels of granularity,
these perturbations can affect a rich set of features that vary from as coarse-grained as global semantic
properties to as fine-grained as a cluster of a few pixels. Our method simply searches for such
perturbations so that the perturbed generated image is mislabelled by the classifier we wish to evaluate.
We use this new method to evaluate the robustness of state-of-the-art ImageNet classifiers to subtle
semantic shifts. Besides finding that these models are not robust in this sense, we find that using
classifiers adversarially that were trained to be robust to bounded pixel perturbations actually decreases
robustness to semantic perturbations. This may be because such classifiers must necessarily depend
more on high-level semantic features of images than than classifiers optimised for accuracy on i.i.d. in-
puts, which tend to rely on low-level features such as texture [11]. Our results strengthen and expand
upon related findings from Yin et al. [12], who find that classifiers robust to pixel-level perturbations
are less robust to corruptions of certain hand-selected features such as artificial ‘fog’ and 2D sinusoids.
2 Background
Robustness under distributional shift When training a discriminative neural network, the goal
is typically to minimise the expected loss E(x,y)∼P0 [l(x,y; θ)] with respect to the model parameters
θ, where P0 is the training distribution over feature spaceX and labels inY. In real-world scenarios,
however, we cannot depend on the distribution at deployment remaining identical to P0 (i.e. we cannot
rely on the i.i.d. assumption). To ensure that models behave well in practice, it is necessary to make
distributionally robust models: they should perform well even after a shift to their input distribution.
Studies have shown that there are many possible shifts to which classifiers are not robust, motivating
a large body of literature which deals with identifying and correcting these problems [5–8, 13–15].
Generative Adversarial Networks GANs are an approach to training generative neural networks
that map from a known standard probability distribution to the distribution of the training data. See a
tutorial for details [16]. While other types of generative networks exist, we focus on the use of GANs in
this work for their crispness. Generative networks have been found to display an interesting property:
different layers, and even different neurons, encode different kinds of features of the image. Earlier
layers tend to encode higher-level information about objects in the image, whereas later layers deal more
with “low-level materials, edges, and colours” [10, p.7]. In addition, it is possible to vary features such
as zoom, object position and rotation, simply by moving the input to the model in a linear walk [17].
3 Related Work
Measuring distributional robustness This paper builds on a body of work examining trained
models’ robustness to distributional shifts. One approach is to apply a hand-selected range of possible
corruptions such as Gaussian noise or simulated effects such as fog or motion blur. Such robustness
benchmarks have been created for datasets including traffic signs [18], ImageNet [8], MNIST [19] and
Cityscapes [20]. Snoek et al. [21] evaluate the robustness of the calibration of classifiers’ confidences
to rotated and translated images, as well as to out-of-distribution inputs such as not-MNIST [22].
Another approach is to gather new data, either replicating original dataset creation processes [23]
or deliberately gathering data representing a challenging shift in distribution [24]; in both cases,
classifiers were found to fail to generalise to the new distributions. Our paper builds on the foundations
laid by these works, providing automaticity by evaluating robustness to learnt features.
2
Adversarial robustness There has been much recent work on ‘adversarial examples’: inputs delib-
erately crafted by an adversary to fool a model [25]. In this literature, an attacker is modelled as having
certain capabilities to construct pathological inputs, while the ‘defender’ aims to create systems that
are robustly correct to all inputs within this threat model. Such attacks can be viewed as the worst-case
distributional shift within the threat model. The customary threat model is constrained perturbations
to the pixel values of a given image [26], for which adversarial robustness does not imply robustness
to semantic changes that induce large changes in pixel values. But there is a burgeoning interest in
new threat models that allow meaningful changes to given images. While the purpose of our method
is to evaluate models’ distributional robustness to plausible semantic shifts, rather than to serve as an
adversarial attack—it is unclear that an attacker could present a perturbed image to a deployed model
without write access to the model’s inputs—some existing semantic ‘attacks’ are related to our method.
Semantic adversarial robustness Initially, semantic adversarial examples were constructed using
hand-coded methods that perturbed features such as colouring [27], rotations and translations [28],
and corruptions such as blurring and fog [29] in an ad-hoc manner. Another possible approach, albeit
prohibitively expensive for most domains, is to write an invertible differentiable renderer and perturb
its parameters to effect semantic changes in the scene [30, 31]. More recently, methods have been
proposed that use generative models to avoid the need to hand-code specific features to perturb.
Qiu et al. [32] use a dataset labelled with various semantic features to train a generative model that
allows inputs determining these features to be adversarially adjusted. Bhattad et al. [33] utilise learnt
colourisation and texture-transfer models to identify worst-case changes to the colour and texture of
given images. Gowal et al. [34] adversarially compose disentangled learned representations of different
inputs. Dunn et al. [35] train a GAN to output a distribution of images that fools the target classifier.
Three imaginative papers construct semantic adversarial examples using some search procedure to
identify a suitable input to a trained generative model [36–38]. We build on the common theme: using
a generative model to learn semantic features, avoiding the need to select and code these by hand.
However, our method is the first to perturb the generator network’s latent activations—not just the input.
This leverages the full range of feature representations learnt from the training dataset, rather than just
the global semantics encoded in the input, allowing for a much richer space of manipulations.
4 Computing semantic perturbations using generative models
Suppose that we have a trained, differentiable image classifier f :X→R|Y| whose robustness we would
like to test, whereX=R3×w×h is RGB pixel space andY is the set of class labels over which f outputs a
confidence distribution. Suppose that we also have a trained generator neural network g :Z→X, which
maps from a standard Gaussian distribution over its input spaceZ=Rm to the distribution of training
images. Although we use the generator of a GAN pair, any generative model would be equally suitable.
Since a feedforward network is a sequence of layers, we can consider g to be a composition of functions
g=gn◦gn−1◦...◦g1. For instance, in our experiments, we decompose BigGAN [39] into its residual
blocks. Here, gi :Ai−1→Ai is the ith layer, taking activations ai−1∈Ai−1 from the previous layer
and outputting the resulting activation tensor gi(ai−1)∈Ai. Splitting in this way allow us to introduce
a perturbation pi∈Ai to layer i’s activations, before continuing the forward pass through the rest of the
generator. Given such a perturbation tensor pi∈Ai for each layer i, we can define perturbed layer func-
tions g′i(ai−1)=gi(ai−1)+pi. By performing such perturbations at every activation space, we obtain
the semantically-perturbed output of the entire generator, g′(z;p0,...,pn)=(g′n◦g′n−1◦...◦g′1)(z+p0).
g1 g2 gn−1 gn
y
fz
g′
` `(f(g′(z;p0,...,pn)),y)...
...p0 p1 p2 pn−2 pn−1 pn
Figure 2: Illustration of a forward pass with semantic perturbations to the latent activation values.
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Suppose that we have sampled some generator input z, and automatically determined the correct
label y of its image under the generator when unperturbed, g′(z; 0, ...,0). This is best done using a
conditional generator that also takes a label as input [40], but can also be achieved by assuming that the
classifier’s initial output is correct. We now need a procedure to identify suitable perturbation tensors
p∗=(p∗0,...,p
∗
n)∈A0× ...×An such that the classifier’s output on g′(z; p∗) is not y but some other
label, while the true label of g′(z;p∗) remains y.
Ensuring misclassification We can define a loss function ` :R|Y|×Y→R such that `(f(g′(z;p)),y)
is minimised when the classifier predicts any label but the correct y, or such that `(f(g′(z;p)), t) is
minimised when the classifier incorrectly predicts target label t. There are many possibilities, but
in this paper we focus on the latter case only, using `(f(x), t)=maxj∈Yf(x)j−f(x)t, the variant
found to be most effective by Carlini and Wagner [41]. Noting that `, f and each g′i are differentiable,
we use the usual backpropagation algorithm to compute the derivative of `(f(g′(z;p)),y) with respect
to p. We then use a gradient-descent optimisation over p to find a perturbation p∗ that minimises `.
By definition of `, this optimal p∗ will ensure that the classifier mislabels perturbed image g′(z;p∗).
Ensuring the true label remains unchanged But we also need the true label of g′(z; p∗) to
remain y, else f might in fact be predicting the correct label. Our approach is to assume that
small semantic changes to an image will not change its correct label (and we verify this in our
experiments). So we would ideally like to identify the smallest perturbation that induces the kind
of mislabelling we are investigating. The approach we take is to constrain the maximum magnitude
of the perturbation—computed as the Euclidean norm of the vector obtained by ‘flattening’ and
concatenating the perturbation tensors pi—and gradually relaxing this constraint during optimisation
until a perturbation p∗ inducing the desired mislabelling is found. The quicker the constraint is relaxed,
the quicker a mislabelling is found, but the larger the expected perturbation.
Per-neuron perturbation scaling to promote uniformity The typical activation values of separate
neurons differ in scale, even within a single layer. If one varies from−1 to 1, while another varies from
−0.1 to 0.1, then a perturbation of magnitude 0.5 is likely to have quite different downstream effects on
the image depending on which of these neurons it affects. To correct for this, we scale the perturbation
for each neuron to the empirically-measured range. That is, rather than adding perturbation tensor
pi directly to the activation tensor at layer i, we add piσi, where is element-wise multiplication
and σi is an empirically-measured tensor of standard deviations of the activation values at layer i.
Even with this scaling, it appears that perturbations can have quite different human-perceived
‘magnitudes’ of downstream effect on the image, depending on which neurons are perturbed. In the
present work, this did not pose a significant problem, since state-of-the-art classifiers require only
small perturbations before their lack of robustness is revealed. But as classifiers improve, it will
become increasingly important that perturbations of similar magnitude have similar downstream visual
effect sizes. This can be obtained by optimising hyperparameters that scale the perturbation to each
neuron as σ does above. For now, our codebase implements this at a per-layer level, since early layers
tend to have larger influence on the final image, changing objects and settings, while later layers have
subtler effects. In this paper each weight is always either 1 or 0.
5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we apply our method to evaluate the robustness of state-of-the-art classifiers to semantic
perturbations, primarily in the context of ImageNet-1K classification [42], perturbing the semantic
features learnt by a pre-trained BigGAN [39]. We evaluate normally-trained classifiers, and two ‘robust’
classifiers adversarially trained against bounded pixel-space perturbations. First, the state-of-the-art
on ImageNet, EfficientNet-B4 with NoisyStudent training [2]. This was the highest-accuracy classifier
for which pre-trained weights were available. Next, the standard ResNet50 classifier [43]. Finally, two
ResNet50 classifiers adversarially trained against pixel-space perturbations: one from Engstrom et al.
[44] trained using an l2-norm PGD attack with radius =0.3, and another from Wong et al. [45], trained
with the FGSM attack for robustness against l∞ with =4/255. See Appendix A for further details.
We focus exclusively on the most concerning case: targeted misclassifications, for which a randomly pre-
determined target label t∈Y is chosen for each semantic perturbation. We can quantitatively assess the
robustness of a classifier by measuring how often we can find such misclassification-inducing perturba-
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(a) Perturbed from ‘alp’ (left) to ‘bison’ (right) by
adjusting the shapes of the mountains, ironing out
rugged details and introducing shadowy boulders.
(b) Perturbed from ‘Pomeranian (dog breed)’ (left) to
‘American lobster’ (right) by changing the fur colour
and dulling glints in the eyes and nose.
(c) Perturbed from ‘sea snake’ to ‘crossword’ by
repositioning the snake and increasing the roughness
of the sea floor.
(d) Perturbed from ‘robin’ to ‘keyboard’ by quantising
the foreground and background undergrowth in more
regular patterns of light and dark.
(e) Perturbed from ‘backpack’ to ‘remote control’ by
recolouring the button and seam, and reshaping the
outline.
(f) Perturbed from ‘mountain tent’ to ‘Norwich
terrier’ by flattening the mountain range and adding
a suspiciously dog-shaped rock formation.
(g) Perturbed from ‘Irish setter’ to ‘tusker’ (elephant)
by adding background undergrowth, raising the ears,
shrinking the nose and extending the body.
(h) Perturbed from ‘bookcase’ to ‘consommé’ (soup)
by replacing the contents of some shelves and
thickening the wooden frame.
Figure 3: A selection of examples to demonstrate a range of possible semantic perturbations. See
Appendix C.2 for further examples.
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(×10 for visibility) (×27 for visibility)
(a) Unperturbed. (b) First six layers. (c) Middle six layers. (d) Last six layers.
Figure 4: The effect of perturbing activations at different layers in the generator, as indicated in
the captions. Differences with the unperturbed image are shown above each perturbed image. The
perturbed images are classified as goldfish. Note the decreasing granularity of changes.
tions given a maximum allowable perturbation size. To do this, we sample inputs to the generator, iden-
tify suitable semantic perturbations, and measure their magnitudes—recall that we relax the constraint
on the perturbation magnitude until the desired misclassification is induced. To evaluate robustness to
changes to different featue granularities, we repeat this robustness analysis, but restrict the perturbations
to affect different subsets of layers. For full details of our experiments, refer to Appendix B.
We also run our experiments on the much simpler (and correspondingly easier to robustly classify)
MNIST dataset [46], using two classifiers: one optimised for i.i.d. accuracy, and one adversarially
trained to be robust to an l2-norm projected gradient descent attack with =0.3. We provide some
discussion in Section 5.2, and results are available in Appendix D.
5.1 Results
Table 1 reports the average magnitude of the misclassification-inducing semantic perturbations,
allowing for easy comparison between classifiers for different perturbation types. Figure 5 elaborates
on this, plotting the relationships between perturbation magnitude and the proportion of inputs for
which this magnitude is sufficient to cause the classifier to predict the target label. These results
exclude the unperturbed generated images of label y for which the classifier already predicts a label
other than y, and those judged by a human not to be of label y. They also exclude perturbed images
for which y is no longer judged to be the true class. See Appendix B.2 for full details of our procedure.
5.2 Discussion
Qualitative results The results in Figure 3 and Appendix C.2 demonstrate that perturbing the latent
activations of generative networks has diverse and meaningful effects. The examples in Figure 4
and Appendix C.1 demonstrate that the perturbing the activations at different layers make changes of
different granularity: perturbations to layers early in the generator tend to affect high-level properties
such as object shape, while perturbations to later layers adjust finer-grained features such as texture.
The wide range of semantic changes automatically generated by our method helps create a more
complete evaluation of a classifier’s robustness.
None of the classifiers are robust to semantic perturbations Figure 5a shows that for all four
classifiers, our method finds misclassification-inducing perturbations for over 80% of the initial
generated images, even with relatively small perturbation magnitudes. This result is consistent with
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Table 1: Mean magnitudes of misclassification-inducing perturbations. Headers indicate the layers
in the generator at which activations are perturbed. Compare results within each column.
All layers First six only Middle six only Last six only
Robust (Engstrom) [44] 36 33 21 141
Robust (“Fast”) [45] 35 29 22 102
EfficientNet [2] 36 97 22 24
ResNet50 [43] 4.2 89 4.2 7.4
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(a) Activation values perturbed at all BigGAN layers.
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(b) Activation values perturbed in the first six layers only.
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(c) Activations perturbed in the middle six layers only.
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(d) Activation values perturbed in the last six layers only.
Figure 5: Graphs showing how the proportion of perturbations that induce the targeted misclassification
increases with perturbation magnitude. Results are shown for four classifiers: two adversarially-trained
classifiers (Engstrom et al. [44] and “Fast” [45]), EfficientNet-B4 NS [2], and standard ResNet50 [43].
The solid lines exclude the perturbed images for which a human judges that the perturbation does
not change the true label of the image; the dotted lines, for reference, include these.
the notion that trained classifiers have learnt to rely on spurious (or at least fragile) feature correlations
that may not generalise beyond the training regime. For instance, relying on background colour to
identify the foreground object may work well if this correlation holds—as it would both during normal
i.i.d. training and adversarial training—but this should not be relied upon at deployment.
Pixel-space robustness improves robustness to some semantic perturbations The lower average
magnitudes required for the pixel-robust classifiers when perturbing the final six layers, as seen in the
last column of Table 1 and the correspondingly flatter curves in Figure 5d, demonstrate that adversarial
training generalises somewhat to confer robustness to fine-grained semantic perturbations. The slightly
gentler gradient at the beginning of Figure 5c suggests that this even provides some limited robustness to
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small semantic perturbations of medium granularity. In both cases, this may be because the perturbations
fall within or nearby the pixel-spaceLp-norm ball that the classifier is trained to be robust within.
But robustness to pixel-space perturbations is a double-edged sword Perturbations to activations
in the early layers of a generator induce changes to high-level semantic properties of an image. These
have a large magnitude when measured in pixel space, so it is unsurprising that classifiers trained to be
robust to norm-constrained pixel perturbations do not have improved robustness to such semantic pertur-
bations. More surprisingly, Figure 5b and Table 1 show that pixel-space robustness in fact considerably
worsens robustness to semantic perturbations to the high-level features encoded in the first six generator
layers. This may be because non-robust classifiers ordinarily depend mainly on low-level features such
as texture [11]. Conversely, pixel-space robust classifiers have been trained to ignore these low-level fea-
tures, and so depend instead on high-level features. However, they are still free to rely on fragile correla-
tions in the high-level features, and so their robustness to high-level semantic perturbations is decreased.
There is already some evidence that classifiers optimised for robustness to constrained adversarial
pixel perturbations seem to have decreased robustness to corruptions concentrated in the low-frequency
Fourier domain [12], decreased robustness to invariance-based attacks that change the true label
but maintain the model’s prediction [47] and little robustness to various hand-coded corruptions not
encountered at training time [48]. Our finding that such models also have significantly decreased
robustness to high-level semantic feature perturbations strengthens and generalises these results.
MNIST The simplicity of the MNIST classification task suggests that constructing a robust classifier
for MNIST should be significantly easier than for ImageNet. We find that adversarial training
against pixel perturbations does not improve robustness to coarse-grained semantic perturbations on
MNIST, but neither does it worsen it. This is likely because the simplicity and low resolution of the
dataset means that there is much less of a difference between pixel-space perturbations and semantic
perturbations, relative to ImageNet. See Appendix D for results and discussion.
5.3 Threats to validity
Our findings depend on consistent and reasonable judgements of image class. To prevent confirmation
bias from distorting the results, we used a labeller who was blind to the purpose of their judgements.
To eliminate potential between-person differences, we used the same labeller throughout. We designed
the labelling interface to be unambiguous (see Appendix B.2 for a screenshot). Lastly, we verified
that a sample of the labels judgements were reasonable, and provide them in Appendix C.2.
A threat to external validity is that our findings fail to generalise to other classifiers, training procedures,
or domains. We note that if true, this would in itself be a surprising result worthy of investigation.
6 Conclusion
Since the i.i.d. assumption cannot be relied upon during deployment, it is necessary for our models
to remain performant when given inputs semantically similar to those in its training distribution. In this
paper, we have introduced a new method that evaluates robustness of image classifiers to such semantic
changes. In particular, by dynamically perturbing the activation values of a trained generative neural
network, our method leverages its full range of learnt feature representations. This allows evaluation of
robustness to features varying from high-level semantic properties such as shape and colour (encoded
in earlier layers) to fine-grained features and textures (encoded in later layers).
We find that modern state-of-the-art ImageNet classifiers are not robust to semantic perturbations.
Furthermore, while classifiers optimised for robustness to bounded pixel perturbations are indeed more
robust to fine-grained features perturbations, this is to the detriment of their robustness to high-level
perturbations. If we are to deploy trained models in the real world, we must be confident in our ability
to verify their robustness to all kinds of potential distributional shifts—including to those beyond
subtle semantic changes. Besides the obvious need for more robust models, our findings motivate
the need for more comprehensive ways of testing classifiers, especially on meaningful distributional
shifts, which are more difficult to systematically produce. Our method points to a promising direction
for creating such tests, by leveraging the latent learnt representations of generative models.
8
Broader Impact
We believe this research can be used to make necessary-but-not-sufficient robustness tests for computer
vision systems which we want to deploy in real-world situations. For example, a clinical decision
support system should not fail to detect a brain tumour due to a small variation in the input data (e.g an
artefact caused by a scanner, or a change in the distribution of patients).
Regulators may therefore choose to utilise methods deriving from our work to identify flaws in safety
cases for new systems—identifying these flaws before approval and deployment could prevent serious
harms. Having adequate tools for this scrutiny may be particularly important given commercial
incentives to deploy quickly, potentially causing developers to give inadequate consideration to safety.
But care must be taken not to naïvely rely on tools based directly on our work as sufficient evidence
of robustness: our method evaluates only subtle semantic shifts, which may not be the only kind of
input encountered during deployment. Our method should be combined with other checks to allow
for a complete evaluation of a classifier’s robustness, and indeed other properties such as bias, privacy,
or fairness. These should be separately evaluated in whichever ways are appropriate for the task at
hand, before a system is deemed ready for deployment.
Developers of safety-critical systems may also use tools maturing from our work to identify and
rectify concerns in a system under development. By evaluating robustness to a wide range of possible
semantic changes, our method can help to characterise weaknesses and therefore inform what kind
of improvements need to be made to a system including a trained component. This might help bring a
product safely to market more quickly than would otherwise have been possible; there is no doubt that
deep learning could provide significant benefits to the safety-critical industries, once the robustness
problem is solved. But equally, there are potential harms associated with speedier deployment of
perfectly safe systems: safe truly autonomous vehicles could lead to mass unemployment; more
generally, wide deployment of autonomous systems is likely to have unforeseen consequences.
Aside from application of developments of our method to evaluate robustness for safety, our method
contributes to our gradually growing understanding of the robustness characteristics of neural
networks. By strengthening the result that adversarial training against pixel perturbations may in fact
be counterproductive when it comes to real-world robustness, we hope that there will be more research
in the future aiming to characterise and address the robustness problem in its broadest sense. A more
thorough understanding of our strengths and limitations seems essential if we are to fully reap the
benefits and mitigate the risks of this still-new technology.
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A Model details
A.1 BigGAN
We use the BigGAN-deep generator architecture at the 512× 512 resolution, which can be found
in Table 9 of Appendix B in the paper introducing BigGAN [39]. Conveniently, this table clearly
indicates the locations at which we perturb the activations; every horizontal line of the table is a point at
which our method can perturb the activation values. Please refer to Appendix B of the BigGAN paper
for detailed descriptions, in particular of the ResBlocks which comprise the majority of the network.
Note that we in essence perform perturbations after each ResBlock; if desired, perturbations could
also be performed within each block. We take the pre-trained generator published by DeepMind [49].
A.2 Standard classifiers
We use two classifiers trained as usual to maximise accuracy on the training distribution. The first
is from the state-of-the-art EfficientNet family [50], enhanced using noisy student training [2]. We use
the best readily available model and pre-trained weights for Pytorch, EfficientNet-B4 (Noisy Student)
from Melas-Kyriazi [51]. The second is PyTorch’s pre-trained ResNet50 [43], made available through
the torchvision package of PyTorch [52]. These classifiers’ ImageNet accuracies are reported
in Table 2.
Table 2: Classifiers’ accuracy on ImageNet, in %
Classifier Top-1 Top-5
ResNet50 76.15 92.87
EfficientNet-B4 NS 85.16 97.47
A.3 Robust classifiers
We use two pre-trained ResNet50 classifiers adversarially trained against bounded pixel perturbations.
The first, ‘ResNet50 Robust (Engstrom)’, from Engstrom et al. [44], was trained using l2-norm
projected gradient descent attack with =0.3. The second, ‘ResNet50 Robust (“Fast”)’, from Fast Is
Better Than Free: Revisiting Adversarial Training Wong et al. [45], was trained with the fast gradient
sign method attack for robustness against l∞ with =4/255. The classifiers’ ImageNet accuracies
and robustness to relevant attacks are shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Classifiers’ accuracy on ImageNet, and robustness to attacks, in %
Classifier
Top-1
(no attack)
Top-1
(l2 attack =0.3)
Top-1
(l∞ attack =4/255)
ResNet50 Robust (Engstrom) 57.90 35.16
ResNet50 Robust (“Fast”) 55.45 30.28
B Experimental setup
B.1 Technical details
For our experiments, we used used the neural networks described in Appendix A, and searched for
semantic perturbations using the procedure described in Sections 4 and 5. However, those sections did
not describe the optimisation procedure used. We used the Adam optimiser [53] with a learning rate of
0.03 and the default β hyperparameters of 0.9 and 0.999. After each optimisation step, we constrained
the magnitude of the perturbation by finding the L2 norm of the perturbation ‘vector’ obtained by
concatenating the scalars used to perturb each individual activation value, then rescaling it to have
a norm no greater than our constraint. This constraint was initially set to be magnitude 1, and was
slightly relaxed after each optimisation step by multiplication by 1.03 and addition of 0.1. These values
were empirically found—using small amount of manual experimentation—to be a reasonable tradeoff
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between starting small and increasing slowly enough to find decently small perturbations, while also
using a reasonable amount of compute. Typically, finding a semantic perturbation under this regime
takesO(100) steps, which tookO(1 minute) using the single NVIDIA Tesla V100 GPU we used.
B.2 Data collection
We computed at least 240 examples to evaluate each classifier for each kind of perturbation; often
many more. This used a fixed progression of randomly-sampled (y,z,t) tuples each time, where y
is the desired true image label, z is the latent input to the generator, and t is the target label for the
perturbed misclassification. This ensures direct comparability between classifiers and perturbation
types, since the semantic perturbations are each time attempting to perturb the same unperturbed image
g(y;z) to be classified as label t.
As described in Section 5, we do not use the examples in our calculations if the classifier misclassifies
the unperturbed image, or if a human judges that the correct label is not the desired label y. We also
filter out those perturbed images for which y does not remain the true label, although Figure 5 also
shows the results with these included as dotted lines. To elicit a judgement about whether a particular
image is indeed of label y, we ask a human participant which of the following four options is the best
description of the image:
1. “This is an image of label y”
2. “This is an image of something else”
3. “It is unclear what this image shows”
4. “This is not an image of anything meaningful”
We use the clear interface shown in Figure 6 to collect these data, and use the measures described in
Section 5.3 to minimise threats to validity.
C ImageNet: further examples
We include a number of examples here, for convenient perusal, but these are limited by space and file
size constraints. Therefore, we also provide all examples and raw results from our experiments as an
anonymous download, to allow the reader to view the full range of perturbation types and validate that
the results are reasonable. Here is the link: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3889777.
C.1 Effect of layer perturbed and classifier evaluated
Figures 7 to 10 further illustrate the effect of performing semantic perturbations to different sets of
neurons in the generator, while evaluating different kinds of classifier. The initial (y,z,t) tuples selected
are chosen so that all sixteen perturbed images for each were judged not to have changed class. These
examples again show the range of feature granularities affected by perturbing activations at different
stages in the generator. They also show visually that, in contrast to the adversarially-trained classifiers,
the classifiers which underwent standard training need only small perturbations to fine-grained features
but require large perturbations to their high-level features to induce the targeted misclassification.
C.2 Various examples
Figures 12 and 11 show the results for perturbing the first sixteen randomly-selected (y,z,t) tuples.
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Figure 6: Screenshot of labelling interface. The perturbed image and buttons, on the right-hand side,
are visible only when the unperturbed image (on the left) has been selected as matching the desired
label. The buttons are numbered to provide keyboard shortcuts. The button at the bottom opens a web
image search, in case the user is unfamiliar with the class label.
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(a) All layers; Engstrom (b) First 6 layers; Engstrom (c) Mid 6 layers; Engstrom (d) Last 6 layers; Engstrom
(e) All layers; “Fast” (f) First 6 layers; “Fast” (g) Mid 6 layers; “Fast” (h) Last 6 layers; “Fast”
(i) All layers; Efficient (j) First 6 layers; Efficient (k) Mid 6 layers; Efficient (l) Last 6 layers; Efficient
(m) All layers; ResNet50 (n) First 6 layers; ResNet50 (o) Mid 6 layers; ResNet50 (p) Last 6 layers; ResNet50
Figure 7: Demonstration of the effect of semantic perturbations performed when restricted to the
activations in only certain layers; each column allows a different subset of activations to be perturbed.
Results are shown for four classifiers, with one classifier per row: two adversarially-trained classifiers
(Engstrom et al. [44] and “Fast” [45]), EfficientNet-B4 NS [2], and standard ResNet50 [43]. Note how
the granularity of features perturbed varies with perturbations to different activations. Note also how
the non-robust classifiers (bottom two rows) require a relatively large perturbation in the first six layers.
17
(a) All layers; Engstrom (b) First 6 layers; Engstrom (c) Mid 6 layers; Engstrom (d) Last 6 layers; Engstrom
(e) All layers; “Fast” (f) First 6 layers; “Fast” (g) Mid 6 layers; “Fast” (h) Last 6 layers; “Fast”
(i) All layers; Efficient (j) First 6 layers; Efficient (k) Mid 6 layers; Efficient (l) Last 6 layers; Efficient
(m) All layers; ResNet50 (n) First 6 layers; ResNet50 (o) Mid 6 layers; ResNet50 (p) Last 6 layers; ResNet50
Figure 8: The perturbed images corresponding to Figure 7. Note the range of semantic features
perturbed, varying from changing the weather (b and j) and the architecture (n) to increasing the
visibility and brightness of flags (c) to minute changes to the position of low-level edges.
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(a) All layers; Engstrom (b) First 6 layers; Engstrom (c) Mid 6 layers; Engstrom (d) Last 6 layers; Engstrom
(e) All layers; “Fast” (f) First 6 layers; “Fast” (g) Mid 6 layers; “Fast” (h) Last 6 layers; “Fast”
(i) All layers; Efficient (j) First 6 layers; Efficient (k) Mid 6 layers; Efficient (l) Last 6 layers; Efficient
(m) All layers; ResNet50 (n) First 6 layers; ResNet50 (o) Mid 6 layers; ResNet50 (p) Last 6 layers; ResNet50
Figure 9: Replication of Figure 7 with another example image.
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(a) All layers; Engstrom (b) First 6 layers; Engstrom (c) Mid 6 layers; Engstrom (d) Last 6 layers; Engstrom
(e) All layers; “Fast” (f) First 6 layers; “Fast” (g) Mid 6 layers; “Fast” (h) Last 6 layers; “Fast”
(i) All layers; Efficient (j) First 6 layers; Efficient (k) Mid 6 layers; Efficient (l) Last 6 layers; Efficient
(m) All layers; ResNet50 (n) First 6 layers; ResNet50 (o) Mid 6 layers; ResNet50 (p) Last 6 layers; ResNet50
Figure 10: The perturbed images corresponding to Figure 9.
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(a) Skipped because the classifier did not predict the
desired label, ‘Labrador retriever’.
(b) Skipped because the human did not agree that ‘vel-
vet’ was the best description of the unperturbed image.
(c) Perturbed from ‘Komodo dragon’ (left) to
‘overskirt’ (right), but the human labeller did not agree
that the label ‘Komodo dragon’ remained the best
description of the perturbed image.
(d) Perturbed from ‘file cabinet’ (left) to ‘doormat’
(right); the human judged the true label of the perturbed
image to remain unchanged.
(e) Perturbed from ‘barn’ to ‘Afghan hound’; the
human judged the true label of the perturbed image
to remain unchanged.
(f) Perturbed from ‘palace’ to ‘throne’; the human
judged the true label of the perturbed image to remain
unchanged.
(g) Perturbed from ‘reflex camera’ to ‘sunglass’; the
human judged the true label of the perturbed image
to remain unchanged.
(h) Perturbed from ‘Blenheim spaniel’ to ‘black-and-
tan coonhound’; the human judged the true label of
the perturbed image to remain unchanged.
Figure 11: The first examples used in our experiments, continued. Engstrom et al.’s adversarially-
trained classifier [44] is the classifier being evaluated. Captions indicate whether each example was
skipped, or the label judgements. Perturbed images are to the right of each unperturbed image.
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(a) Skipped because the classifier did not predict the
desired label, ‘bath towel’.
(b) Perturbed from ‘rotisserie’ to ‘rain barrel’; the
human judged the true label of the perturbed image
to remain unchanged.
(c) Perturbed from ‘breastplate’ to ‘mud turtle’; the
human judged the true label of the perturbed image
to remain unchanged.
(d) Skipped because the human did not agree that
‘spotted salamander’ was the best description of the
unperturbed image.
(e) Perturbed from ‘yurt’ to ‘library’; the human
judged the true label of the perturbed image to remain
unchanged.
(f) Perturbed from ‘cougar’ to ‘shower cap’; the human
judged the true label of the perturbed image to remain
unchanged.
(g) Perturbed from ‘chickadee’ to ‘soap dispenser’; the
human judged the true label of the perturbed image
to remain unchanged.
(h) Skipped because the classifier did not predict the
desired label, ‘trombone’.
Figure 12: The first examples used in our experiments, with randomly-selected source and target labels.
Engstrom et al.’s adversarially-trained classifier [44] is the classifier being evaluated. Captions indicate
whether each example was skipped, or the label judgements.
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Table 4: MNIST convolutional generator architecture. Each new line represents a new layer. Each
horizontal lines marks an activation tensor at which semantic perturbations are performed.
Fully-Connected (64 units)
ReLU
Transposed Convolution (5×5 kernel, 2×2 stride, 32 feature maps)
Batch Normalisation
Leaky ReLU (Slope−0.2)
Dropout (p=0.35)
Transposed Convolution (5×5 kernel, 2×2 stride, 8 feature maps)
Batch Normalisation
Leaky ReLU (Slope−0.2)
Dropout (p=0.35)
Transposed Convolution (5×5 kernel, 2×2 stride, 4 feature maps)
Batch Normalisation
Leaky ReLU (Slope−0.2)
Dropout (p=0.35)
Fully-Connected (784 units)
Sigmoid (tanh used during training)
D MNIST
D.1 Model details
MNIST convolutional GAN For MNIST, we tried a range of generators and found that they all
worked roughly as well as one another. For the experiments, we use a simple convolutional generator,
inspired by the Deep Convolutional GAN [54]. Details are shown in Table 4. Inputs to the generator
are drawn from a 128-dimensional standard Gaussian. The sigmoid output transformation ensures
that pixels are in the range [0,1], as expected by the classifiers. We perform semantic perturbations
before ReLU layers, rather than after, to prevent ReLU output values from being perturbed to become
negative, which would not have been encountered during training and so may not result in plausible
images being generated since they are out-of-distribution for the rest of the generator. Note that
perturbing before and after the sigmoid transformation has different effects because perturbations
to values not close to 0 are diminished in magnitude if passed through the sigmoid function.
Classifiers We use two neural networks that classify MNIST. One is a simple standard classifier with
two convolutional layers and three fully-connected layers, trained to give an accuracy over 99%. The
other is an LeNet5 classifier adversarially trained against l2-norm bounded perturbations for =0.3.
This was trained using the AdverTorch library [55]. It has a standard accuracy of 98%, reduced to
95% by an l2-norm bounded attack with =0.3.
D.2 Experimental setup
We find semantic perturbations as described for ImageNet in Appendix B, with a few differences. First,
since the generator is much smaller, we divide it nearly in half, comparing the effect of perturbing
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(a) Generator activations perturbed at first 4 layers only.
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(b) Generator activations perturbed at last 4 layers only.
Figure 13: Graphs showing how the proportion of perturbations that induce the targeted misclassi-
fication increases with perturbation magnitude. These should be interpreted as Figure 5. The solid
lines exclude the perturbed images for which a human judges that the perturbation does not change
the true label of the image; the dotted lines, for reference, include these.
the activation values at first four layers only with the effect of perturbing at the last four layers only.
Second, because MNIST (and the generator) is much smaller, so are the perturbation magnitudes
required. So the learning rate is reduced to 0.004, the we start with an initial perturbation magnitude
constraint of 0.1, and this is gradually relaxed after each optimisation step by increasing this upper
bound by 0.001. The procedure for collecting human judgements is as described in Appendix B.
D.3 Results and discussion
Figure 13 shows the robustness of the two classifiers to the two kinds of semantic perturbation. We can
see from Figure 13b that the classifier trained to be robust to pixel-space perturbations is indeed more
robust than the standard classifier, with its considerably shallower slope indicating that a bigger pertur-
bation magnitude is required to the finer-grained features encoded in the last four layers of the generator.
Conversely, Figure 13a gives an almost-identical shape for both classifiers, indicating that adversarial
training against pixel-space perturbations does not confer any robustness to the coarse-grained
semantic perturbations being evaluated here. This has an interesting relationship with our main finding,
that adversarial training against pixel-space perturbations seriously harms robustness to high-level
semantic features perturbations on ImageNet. The difference can likely be best explained by the great
difference in datasets. The dimensionality of ImageNet is over 1000× greater, and the high-level
semantic feature space of MNIST is trivially small in comparison. The result of this is that in some
loose sense, there is a smaller ‘gap’ between the highest- and lowest-granularity features encoded
in the generator; put another way, there is a much less rich space of coarse-grained semantic features
that a classifier must be robust to on MNIST.
Whether this is the correct intuition, the implications of our finding remains clear: even on the very
simplest datasets, robustness to fine-grained features completely fails to generalise to more semantic
features. If we are to obtain classifiers that we can trust to generalise under modest distributional shifts,
there is still far to go.
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Figure 14: Random sample of semantic perturbations targeting label 0. Only the first four layers of
generator activations are perturbed, and the classifier is trained using a standard training procedure.
In each pair, the perturbed image is to the right of the unperturbed image.
Figure 15: Random sample of semantic perturbations targeting label 0. Only the first four layers of
generator activations are perturbed, and the classifier is trained using adversarial training. In each
pair, the perturbed image is to the right of the unperturbed image.
Random sample of semantic perturbations targeting label 0. Only the last four layers of generator
activations are perturbed, and the classifier is trained using a standard training procedure. In each
pair, the perturbed image is to the right of the unperturbed image.
Figure 16: Random sample of semantic perturbations targeting label 0. Only the last four layers of
generator activations are perturbed, and the classifier is trained using adversarial training. In each
pair, the perturbed image is to the right of the unperturbed image.
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